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NURTURE AND PARENTING IN ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS 
SOPHIA CONNELL 
 
Abstract: For Aristotle, in making the deliberate choice to incorporate the extensive 
requirements of the young into the aims of one’s life, people realise their own good. In 
this paper I will argue that this is a promising way to think about the ethics of care and 
parenting. Modern theories, which focus on duty and obligation, direct our attention to 
conflicts of interests in our caring activities. Aristotle’s explanation, in contrast, explains 
how nurturing others not only develops a core part of the self but also lead to an 
appreciation of the value of interpersonal relationships.  
 
‘It looks as though nature herself desires to provide that there shall be a feeling of 
attention and care for the young offspring. In the inferior animals this feeling which 
she implants lasts only until the moment of birth; in others, until the offspring reaches 
its complete development; and in those that have more intelligence (phronimôtera), 
until its upbringing is completed (ektrophên). Those which are endowed with most 
intelligence show intimacy and affection (philia) towards their offspring even after 
they have reached their complete development (human beings and some of the 
quadrupeds are examples of this)’ (Aristotle, Generation of Animals [GA] III.2.753a7-
13). 
 
 “I’ll tell you something I never see anyone admit. They are exhausting, frustrating 
and life-destabilizing. They are rarely fun. Sure, smiles are great, hugs are lovely, but 
it’s HARD & not obviously a good choice in life.” (Duncan Jones on Twitter, 2019) 
 
I.  
Introduction. For Aristotle, all perishable living beings must reproduce in order for their way 
of life to continue. Humans are no exception to this rule of nature. Bringing new human 
beings into the world is, however, a complicated and arduous process which only begins with 
birth. It is this part of the human condition upon which I will concentrate, giving a rationale 
derived from principles found in Aristotelian ethics, to explain how caring for those younger 
than ourselves is a good choice in life and that our lives cannot be fulfilled without it. 
Although my focus is mainly on parenting, the implications of this account extend beyond 
biological parenthood, to the nurture and care of all those younger than ourselves and to the 
perpetuation of such practices in human communities.  
Aristotelian ethics enriches our understanding of the value of parenting and caring; it 
can do so more effectively than more familiar frameworks. The most common way to make 
sense of parenting is to see it as a duty or obligation, fitting the ongoing activities involved 
into a deontological model (Brake, 2010, Brighouse and Swift, 2014, Richards 2010, Archard 
2010). This outlook pits the well-being of the parent or carer against that of the child. This 
not only creates difficulties for motivating (unpaid) care but also misses out something that 
most people acknowledge, which is that being a carer can come with a sense of achievement, 
well-being or happiness.  Brighouse and Swift’s contention that ‘our lives have been hugely 
enriched by our experience of parenting’ (p. xv) cannot be adequately accounted for by their 
own emphasis on deontology; Aristotle offers us a way to make sense of their sentiments.1 
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Rights and duties have their place in a modern account of the ethics of parenting. I wouldn’t wish to deny that 
the rights of children require protection. But there is more that needs to be said a bout this complex 
relationship, other than what can be expressed in terms of a focus on individualistic clashes of interests. 
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Since parenting and caring for those younger than ourselves is part of intelligent 
virtue for Aristotle, chosen on the basis of sound reasoning, it constitutes an achievement in 
the sense of the production of something good, another human to flourish in the next 
generation. Achieving this end counts as part of the producer’s well-lived life. One might 
worry that this would make parenting and caring selfish; surely good parenting involves self-
sacrifice or putting the good of the child before one’s own. But there is something not quite 
right about this assumption as Jean Hampton’s (1993) example of the self-sacrificing parent 
makes clear.  Her example of a mother who fails to care for herself adequately, and so puts 
her children’s lives at risk, illustrates that the completely self-sacrificing parent can neither 
lead a good life for herself nor really help others. The Aristotelian model, which also employs 
examples of mothers, explains that caring for and nurturing children and young people does 
not properly involve self-sacrifice but, rather, self-actualisation. More importantly, it also 
explains how separating out the interests of individuals does not fit what is required for viable 
nurturing relationships. 
I begin with the Aristotelian biological basis of nurturing and caring relationships (II); I 
then explain how human lives must incorporate a uniquely human variety of practical 
intelligence, involving deliberate choice. It is in this setting that the care for the young finds 
its place. Section (III) will explain how the activities directed toward nurture constitute a 
certain sort of friendship, in which the younger person receives more love than she gives. The 
next section (IV) explains how, for Aristotle, nurturing is a sort of benefaction and 
production; the young person is a product, which the nurturer can take pride in as their own. 
In the conclusion (V) I will reflect on the implications for this vision of nurture and care. 
 
II.  
Aristotle on Parenting. As was evident in the first quotation from the GA, Aristotle is keen to 
note that humans share many characteristics with the more intelligent animals, such as 
viviparous blooded quadrupeds, birds and social insects. All these animals employ their 
intelligence in several vital activities: one prominent activity is nurturing the young of their 
kind (Labarrière 1990, pp. 423-5). This intelligence is not merely mechanical but involves 
responses to new situations which require adaptation of previously learned behaviours. So, 
for example, the doe has learned to give birth along the roadside in aiming to preserve her 
young. The road, she knows, indicates the presence of humans which keeps predators away 
(HA VII(IX) 5.611a15-23). There is a sense in which she knows the concept of road, human 
and predator, because she has memories and a form of experience (A Po. II.19). Many 
animals also train their young as part of their parenting role. The doe teaches the young to 
shelter where it is safe (HA VIII.5, 611a20-21); the seal makes her young repeat the journey 
to the sea until they understand how to get there on their own (HA VI.12.567a5-7). Many 
birds protect and care for their young and train them (HA VIII(IX).7.612b26-32). Indeed, 
birds are particularly skilled in their parenting, and may even be able to communicate with 
each other through meaningful signs (HA IV.536b8-18).2  All such actions are part of the 
practical intelligence of these animals. In non-human animals, who are incapable of self-
reflection (EE VII.2.1236b5-7), practical intelligence (phronêsis) is always directed at 
achieving a way of living well for that type (EN VI.7.1141a22-33). So, for a cuckoo to live 
well is for her to place her offspring in another’s nest, since she is aware that she cannot 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Explaining the motivations and values that surround the incredibly challenging and difficult process of raising a 
child requires a much more involved account of intell igent engagement and social intertwinement which the 
Aristotelian framework better provides. 
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herself care for the young (HA VIII(IX).29.618a26-29).  Non-human animal knowledge 
exists only as experience or knack (empeiria; Metaph. I.1.981a4) – doing the right thing in a 
way that has worked before, without knowledge of the causal basis of this success.3 For 
humans, intellectual reasoning uniquely forms a part of their way of living well (EN 
I.7.1097b34-1098a17). Thus, does practical reasoning (phronêsis) take on a different or more 
complete form in the human kind.   
Practical reasoning as manifested in human beings requires deliberative choice, 
involving a knowledge of what is best in each situation from a broader perspective (Russell 
2014, p. 205). Human practical reasoning requires not only a good knowledge of the situation 
at hand and the particulars of it, in order to make the correct decisions, but also a view of 
what makes a life go well – an overall vision of the coordination of different commitments 
and concerns within one’s life. For us, phronêsis is the ability ‘to deliberate finely 
about…what promotes living well in general’ (VI.5.1140a25-28). It also requires regularly 
surveying and checking that things are going to plan within a life, that is, self-reflection and 
constant re-evaluation.  
Although non-human animals have certain ‘natural’ virtues, such as those that are 
directed toward care and nurture, humans alone can have full or proper (kuria) virtue, 
meaning virtue integrated with practical understanding of a specifically human sort.4  Non-
human animals cannot deliberate (HA I.1.448b24) or choose deliberately (EN III.2.1111b8-
10; II.6.1106a36). This means that their virtues are not under their control, making them often 
fail to reach their goals (EN VI.13.1144a8-10). A good example of this is the barren mare 
whose parental virtues are applied unsuccessfully to the foal of another horse; because it has 
no milk, and does not understand this, the attempt to care kills the young (HA 
VIII(IX).4.611a10).  
The necessity of human intelligence, with its ability to understand causes and 
principles and survey the larger picture, transforms human’s natural feelings, including those 
concerned with parenting and caring for the young. As Aristotle explains in his Politics, 
‘human beings do many things against habit and nature, if reason persuades them that they 
ought’ (VI.12.1332b7-9). What distinguishes human practical intelligence (phronêsis) is an 
understanding of what is good and bad (Pol. I.1, 1253a16-17) and having a choice to pursue 
activities and perform actions based on this understanding. Virtue also requires the right 
feelings and emotions for Aristotle, but without the conscious choice (prohairesis) to endorse 
and deliberately choose, actions that result from merely following feelings cannot count as 
fully virtuous.  
Although there exists an unchosen, ‘natural’, desire to produce other humans and care 
for the young (Pol. I.1.1252a28-30; GA III.2.753a7-13; EE 1241b2-4; EN 1161b18-29), these 
starting points are not enough but must be transformed into ‘full’ (kuria) virtue by practical 
reasoning. This means that Aristotle’s views are much closer to a contemporary voluntarist 
position than a naturalistic one (for example, Brake 2010). Human beings ought not to act on 
feelings without reason, according to Aristotle. For this to be part of a well lived human life, 
both the creation of and the care for a child must be deliberately chosen. Thus, Aristotle does 
not fit one dominant pattern in modern ethics which downplays parenting (and mothering in 
particular) as a sort of unthinking instinct (Held 2006, p. 26). Instead, Aristotle would agree 
with Sara Ruddick (1989) that mothering (and any parenting for that matter) requires 
intelligence.  
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The necessary involvement of practical reasoning at the highest level transforms a 
natural feeling of care into a set of activities and commitments that form part of an 
intelligently lived life.5 Even, and perhaps especially, nurturing very young children, given 
their vulnerability and the precision of their needs6, requires a high degree of practical 
intelligence. And yet, the early efforts to feed and maintain the existence of a human infant 
are only a very small part of human nurture.7  Intelligence is required also as the child grows 
and begins to try to make her own choices. The example I give you is set out by Ruddick: ‘a 
child leans out of a high-rise window to drop a balloon full of water on a passer-by’. As 
Ruddick explains, the response to this child must respect three important fundamental goods. 
The life of the child must be protected (preservation) and so she must be pulled away from 
the window. At the same time, it must be explained to the child that she must not endanger 
innocent people as part of ongoing development of her virtue (training). And finally, in 
explaining how the child ought to act and why her actions were inappropriate, the parent must 
not undermine the child’s self-respect and confidence (nurturance) (Ruddick 1989, p. 23).  
Aristotle recognises how slowly children develop and that they must be given continual 
guidance in order to become fully competent, or complete, as he would term it. A fully 
complete human being must in the best circumstances will result in a virtuous and eudaimôn 
individual. Part of training of the young towards this goal involves making sure that they can 
thoughtfully engage in their own process of maturation into practical reasoners.8 This also 
involves an intertwinement of the thought patterns of the nurturer and the nurtured. So, for 
example, in explaining why a particular action should or should not be undertaken, the child 
will come to understand and the reasons of the nurturer and these can eventually become her 
own reasons (EN X.9, 1180a6-19).  
For Aristotle, children and parents are related by friendship (EN 1155a17-21). 
Aristotle also refers to children as ‘external goods’ (EN I.8 1099a31-b6). This does not mean 
they are additions to the internal activities of virtue, but that they constitute the means by 
which those activities are actualised (EN I.8.1099a31-b6; VIII.12.1161b18-29; 1162a27-8; 
Scott 2000, pp. 212-3). As such, the connections to children is something that can extend 
beyond one’s own life, which is why what happens to them 
 after the death of a parent is important. 
 
 ‘[A] dead person also, it seems, has good or evil when, for example, …his children, 
and descendants in general, do well or suffer misfortune’ (EN I.10.1100a19-23). 
 
In order to make better sense of how Aristotle thinks of the parent/child relationship and how 
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 For Aristotle, l iving well in this manner is not a fleeting feeling or even a set of interests, instead it is a 
‘complete l ife’ (I.10, 1101a16, X.7.1177b25) – a l ife that is woven together of the correct feelings and 
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7
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Friendship and Love in Caring for the Young. As with natural virtue, choice and practical 
intelligence must be added to any ‘natural’ friendship to make it properly virtuous.9 Human 
friendship is a stable state (hexis), rather than a feeling, involving deliberative choice 
(prohairesis) (EN VIII.1.1155a31; 5.1157b29-32).10 Thus, it is not the feelings of affection or 
even the actions of caring that constitute the friendship, it is the choice to undertake ongoing 
parenting responsibilities as part of a vision of what has overall value. The specific type of 
friendship involved in parenting is unequal because the parent is superior to the child. At first 
in EN VIII 7 Aristotle remarks that unequal friendship will be evened out by the superior 
party being loved more than the inferior one: 
 
‘In all friendships implying inequality the love also should be proportional, i.e. the 
better should be more loved than he loves, and so should be more useful…for when 
the love is proportional to the merit of the parties, then in a sense arises equality, 
which is held to be characteristic of friendship’ (trans. Irwin, EN VIII.7.1158b24). 
 
This equalling out idea, modelled on justice, turns out not to be an appropriate way to 
characterise the activities of nurture. In nurturing friendships, the goodness comes from the 
activity of loving rather than being passively loved. Aristotle uses parental love to illustrate 
this point: 
 
‘[Friendship] seems to lie in loving rather than in being loved, as is indicated by the 
delight mothers take in loving; for some mothers hand over their children to be 
brought up, and so long as they know their fate they love them and do not seek to be 
loved in return. She would seem to be satisfied if she sees the child doing well, and 
she loves the child even if ignorance prevents them from according to her what befits 
a mother.  Friendship, then, consists more in loving’ (EN VIII.8.1159a27-34). 
 
The seeming contradiction between unequal friendship requiring the inferior to love 
more and the fact that in the case of parents the superior loves more can be mitigated in 
several ways. First, the justice model applies best to friendship that will always remain 
unequal, such as that between a ruler and someone ruled over (VIII.7.1158b13-14). In 
monarchy, the relationship between the king and his subjects is one of perpetual rule,11 and so 
there is no need for the king to bestow nurturing love on his subjects in the attempt to bring 
them up to his level. In these cases, the equalising model is appropriate as there is no change 
in or development of their relation to one another. There is no point in the ruler putting in 
more effort and love since the ruled over will never advance but remain dependent on him. In 
the case of the unequal relationship between parent and child, they will eventually become 
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equals when the child has fully matured.12 Even if this does not occur until after the death of 
the parent, the presumption is that this is where the friendship is heading.  
The second point is this: in the case of parent and child, the nature of the feelings of 
the ‘superior’ individual toward the inferior one is different from the nature of the feelings of 
the inferior for the superior – given this, the equalising model is inadequate to describe it. The 
parent has an active love for the child which seeks to cultivate her life; in the case of the 
child, she does not have an active role in aiding the adult, but rather displays respect and 
gratitude (1158b21).13 Although both parties must wish each other well and have a degree of 
mutual affection, ‘that on account of which’ they have this affection differs. This unusual 
situation almost makes it seem to be two sorts of friendship stuck together – one of parent for 
child and the other of child for parent (Pakaluk 1998, p. 91). Another unusual feature is that the 
friendship seems to be able to exist when the child has no feelings whatsoever for the parent 
(1159a33). This, then, contravenes Aristotle’s usual mutuality requirement (EN 
VIII.2.1156a1-5; EE VII.2.1236b2-3).  
Let’s return to consider more closely the example of the mother given above. Recall 
that for humans, parenting activities are a sort of virtue, involving practical reasoning. Unlike 
the mare that could not understand the overall good and so damaged her charge (HA 
VIII(IX).4.611a10), this mother employs practical intelligence in deliberately choosing to 
send her child away. As with all practical reasoning, this person must understand the situation 
extremely well – both in terms of the social setting, the child’s personality and her own life 
goals.14 Using reason, she thereby supersedes her own merely natural virtue of desiring to 
personally nurture her own child.15  In this case, it is not by caring directly for this infant that 
the goal of its proper nurture can be achieved. In ‘seeing the child do well’, she is satisfied 
and thus we find this aspect of the Aristotelian view – the goal of this virtue is beyond one’s 
own well-being; it is the well-being of another. Having a goal that one aims towards outside 
oneself must now be further explored in Aristotelian ethics and metaphysics. 
 
IV 
Care as Benefaction and Production. What are we to make of the fact that the parent or older 
friend loves the benefited younger friend more in light of the fact that unequal friendship is 
supposed to be equalised by love? Although such friendships have unusual features, 
commentators often continue to have difficulty resolving this seeming contradiction.16 The 
fuller answer to this worry is to consider the value of active nurturing. This is what Aristotle 
begins to explore when he first recognises the puzzle in his Eudemian Ethics.   
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‘It is puzzling why those who produce benefit (poiêsantes eu) love those who have 
received it more than those who receive benefit from those who produce it, when the 
opposite seems to be just’ (my translation, EE VII.8, 1241a35-38). 
 
The preliminary answers he offers are that the feelings involved are somehow ‘natural’ 
(phusikos) (1241a40) because loving is active and being active is more choiceworthy 
(hairetoteron). This has to do with the ‘inferior’ friend that is benefited being the product 
(ergon) of the beneficiary.  
 
‘There is the same relation between the effect and the activity, the benefited being as 
it were an effect or production of the benefactor.  Hence in animals their strong 
feelings for their offspring both in begetting them and in preserving them afterwards. 
And so fathers love the children – and still more mothers – more than they are loved 
by them…mothers love more than fathers because they think the children to be more 
their own production; for the amount of work is measured by the difficulty, and the 
mother suffers more in birth’ (EE VII.8.1241b1-9, translation J. Solomon). 
 
Aristotle spends more time on the case of benefactors and producers in Nicomachean 
Ethics IX.7.  The fact that benefactors love beneficiaries more than the other way around is 
noted as something that seems ‘unreasonable’ (X.7.1167b17-18), presumably with respect to 
the same seeming clash noted in the Eudemian Ethics. Furthermore, perhaps with the mother 
case in mind, Aristotle notes that when the beneficiary has nothing positive to give to the 
benefactors this does not affect the benefactor’s feelings or the potential success of her active 
love: ‘benefactors love and feel friendship for those who receive their benefactions even 
when the recipient are of no use now or may never be’ (1167b30-33). Aristotle proceeds to 
explain what there is, then, that makes these activities worthwhile for the benefactor. 
The gain to benefactor is best understood within the broader metaphysical structure of 
active production.17 Within this framework, the activity of loving the beneficiary is about 
loving the product of one’s work. But it is also about loving one’s own existence. This is how 
Aristotle explains it: 
 
‘Existence (to einai) is choiceworthy and loveable for everything. We exist in so far 
as we are actualised, by living and acting.  The product is, in a way, the actualisation 
of the producer. Hence the producer is fond of the product, because he is fond of his 
own being. And this is natural. For what he is potentially, the product indicates in its 
actualisation. At the same time the benefactor’s action is fine for him so that he is 
pleased by that person’ (my translation, EN IX.7.1168a5-10). 
 
To elucidate this rather puzzling passage, commentators look to Aristotle’s other works for 
some clues about the broader metaphysics.  What needs to be made sense of is (1) how the 
activity of loving a beneficiary is like producing something outside ourselves. Once (1) is 
clear, we can then return to ethics to find out (2) how this process involves a love for one’s 
own existence and (3) how the existence of the younger friend brings joy to the nurturer.  
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(1) In his Metaphysics and other works, Aristotle explains how the actualisation of a 
producer can exist outside her in a separate product, while also being a realisation of an 
internal capacity (Metaph. IX.8.1050a4-33). An active faculty can produce something 
internal to the agent (for example, sight) or something external to the agent (for example, a 
building which has been built by the agent or learning in the person that has been taught by 
her). Let’s take the case of learning. Before a person has learned something, the teacher has 
the active capacity to teach and the student has the passive capacity to learn; the realisation of 
both active and passive capacities brings about one result: learning (1050a31-32).18 Another 
example from Aristotle’s biology is animal generation. Active and passive capacities in male 
and female are actualised in one product, the offspring.19 On the model of production that we 
have been considering, the actuality of the internal capacity will only be complete when its 
product is.20 Thus the completion of the building, the learning that takes place in the learner, 
and the new animal are all products that exist outside the producer. When they are complete 
or actualised, this is also the actualisation of the producer qua producer. For example, in the 
case of the builder, the building is how her capacity as builder is realised. If she runs out of 
building materials and the building is never completed, then her productive capacity has 
never been properly actualised.  
The model from the metaphysics allows that a person as poet, builder or parent is not 
fully actualised as the producer of those effects, until these products are complete. This helps 
to explain how the completion of a product which is outside of us is also the completion of a 
capacity within us.  Thus, if our children and friends don’t mature after our deaths, our 
nurturing capacity will have never been realised and we are thus affected by these events 
beyond the grave.21 
(2) Aristotle insists that in loving beneficiaries, we are somehow affirming our own 
existence. Strictly speaking, this model applies only to nurturing benefaction. The nurturing 
benefactor inculcates good habits and reasons in order that the individual lead a good and 
happy human life. Other types of benefactor, who for example donate money or property, 
don’t enrich what their benefactors are essentially but rather something extrinsic, giving 
something which they can employ for either good or ill.  In cases of nurturing benefaction, 
beneficiaries are products of the benefactor and it is natural (phusikos; EN IX.7.1168a9) that 
the producer loves her product22 because this is a love for her own existence. This is not just 
because internal capacities are being actualised but also because the producer values and 
continue to identify with their products.  In the ethics, these ideas are compared to the 
feelings of a poet, who love their poems as if they were their children (1168a1-6).  
There is some puzzle about why Aristotle would use the example of poems.23 It is 
possible he is thinking here of Plato’s Symposium which urges that poems are better than 
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 Ph. III.3. The actualisation of active and passive potentials is ‘one’ (202b1 -2); there is nothing strange about 
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human children (Sym. 209d-e), an idea he appears to disagree with. In any case, the 
comparison is helpful in the following ways. There are two reasons why poems are like 
children, the difficulty and skill involved in producing them and their subsequent unique 
connection to their producer. Sappho’s skill and effort will be similar to that of other 
successful poets but her poems are her own and no others. This is why she will feel 
particularly attached to the lines ‘cold sweat holds me and shaking grips me all, greener than 
grass’ and not so attached to the lines ‘of all things that are alive and have understanding, 
woman is the most unfortunate’ (of Euripides).24 Sappho’s poems will have an effect on 
others apart from her since they exist externally but her relationship to them is unique.  
The comparison to human children works on these similarities. Giving birth to a child 
is hard work (1168b26); raising it correctly is even more challenging and requires 
considerable skill.  An individual result of a craft process is the product of a particular series 
of actions expressive of the artisan’s skill, which will make it unique.  Similarly, one’s child 
or younger friend is a unique product of one’s practical intelligence. Parents make their 
children who they will become through their bespoke nurturing activities.25 Aristotle notes 
that the reason for affection of the sort parents feel for children has to do with the unique 
(idion) and possessive relationship they have with them (Pol. II.1.1262b23).26  
(3) Nicomachean Ethics Book IX Chapter 7’s attempt to explain the reason why 
benefactors love even when they get nothing in return is that they benefit through their own 
active engagement and in appreciating the product of their efforts. With respect to ourselves, 
we desire and love our own existence (1168a6). As animals, we exist in activity or actuality; 
benefaction is active loving, rather than passive receipt of care (1168a18). Furthermore, being 
productive, it leaves a product behind after it is no longer active. What remains is another 
good human being, a fine one (kalon).  Even when the nurture is complete, and the 
beneficiary fully human herself, the benefactor has an enrichment and source of happiness in 
her own life, in seeing the younger friend do well. Thus, as Aquinas (1964) puts it, ‘the 
benefactor takes joy in his beneficiary, as a person in whom his good is attained’ (p. 561).   
Aristotle uses craft analogies to make clear the activity and effort that it takes to 
achieve the human good. For example, in the famous function argument, he compares the 
good human life to the achievements of artisans.27 However, the craft cases only take us so 
far.28  In the case of nurturing benefaction, there are two key differences between artisan and 
human qua human. The human qua human, through virtuous agency, produces another 
virtuous human being, with an active life of its own. This means that her action lives on, 
especially in the sense that the younger human will emulate and mimic to a certain extent the 
carer’s own virtues, while making intelligent decisions for herself.29 A poem, in contrast, 
cannot live and develop in line with the poet’s ideals.30 The second difference is that any craft 
is only a small part of human excellence. The activity of being a good poet might in some 
ways make one’s life go well, but the activity of being a good human is central to it. Not all 
humans are poets but, for Aristotle, all humans must be nurturers, or else the human condition 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
requires knowledge (Metaph. I.1). Poetry is, for him, ‘more philosophical’ than history because it deals with 
the universal (Poet. 9.1451b5-7). 
24
 Lines from Sappho Fragment 31 are translated by Anne Carson 2003. Lines from Euripides’ Medea 230-231 
are my translation.  
25
 The individualised nurture of a parent or close associate is especially effective in producing good people ( EN 
X.9, 1180b4-17). 
26
 ‘the parent regards their children as their own more than the product regards the maker as its own’ (EN 
VIII.11.1161b22-24). 
27
 Aristotle also uses crafts to describe how we acquire virtues through training (1106b15). 
28
 Human virtue is ‘better and more exact than craft’ (1130a31). 
29
 I do not here explore the role of emulation in moral education. For a recent discussion see Hampson 2019. 
30
 Although Aristotle asks us to imagine that a poem had come to l ife (1168a1). 
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disintegrates, and we cease to have humans in the future. Poems cannot either think thoughts 
of their own or have a relationship with the poet and these differences are the ones that make 
best sense of how our younger friends enrich our lives. 
There is another dimension to the productive love of beneficiaries other than the mere 
realisation of one’s own capacities and appreciation of its products. The reason why the fate 
of beneficiaries is part of one’s own existence and well-being has to do with the relationship 
between benefactor and beneficiary.  Nurture requires developing the character of one’s 
charge and because the friend comes to be good in a way that is very similar to the way the 
agent is good, they have a ‘complete’ form of friendship, based on character (EN VIII.3, 
1156b7-33).  The product of nurturing love is, in a way, part of oneself through the friendship 
relation.  Both during development and also after it is complete, the lives of the nurturer and 
nurtured are intertwined and interpenetrating. To understand this better, we must return to the 
context of EN IX discussion which explains the Aristotelian view that a friend is another self.  
Chapter 4 of EN IX explains how the attitudes and relations one has with a friend are 
similar to the attitudes and relations one has with oneself (1166a10-11). Benefaction is 
crucial, the first item noted as a sign of friendship being ‘to wish and promote by action the 
real or apparent good of another for their own sake’.31 The second mark of friendship is to 
wish one’s friend to exist and live, which Aristotle notes is particularly true of parents (here 
mothers 1166a6). Aristotle closely links the desire to exist and flourish with relation to 
oneself to the desire for one’s friend to exist and flourish.  
 
‘The virtuous person is related to her friend in the same way she is related to herself, 
since her friend is another herself. Therefore, just as her own being (einai) is 
choiceworthy for her, her friend’s being is choiceworthy for her in the same or a 
similar way’ (my translation, 1170b7-9).32 
 
There is a sense in which the existence and flourishing of one’s friend is not just a reflection 
of one’s own existence and flourishing but actually a part of it. What it is to live a good life is 
to make the correct reasoned choices, to be practically intelligent which is very challenging 
(EN III.11, 1109a20-30; IV.8, 1142a21). This is why there are almost no important decisions 
that are made entirely on one’s own.33 In deliberating what to do, agents bring to mind 
previous deliberations made together with friends, thoughtful discussions with them about 
similar or related situations, and reflections on what friends would do in such situations. In 
this way friends ‘become still better from their activities and their mutual correction.  For 
each moulds the other in what they approve of’ (EN IX.12.1172a10-13). When we help 
someone through sharing reasons and values, the reasons on which our friend acts are in a 
sense her own, but the source of these reasons is their original possession by us. As Aristotle 
puts it: ‘what our friends achieve is, in a way, achieved through our agency, since the origin 
is in us’ (EN III.3.1112b28-9). 
This pattern of intertwinement is even more strongly evident in friendships between 
older and younger people which aim at the completion and virtue of the younger party. As 
described earlier, human nurture requires one to explain why certain actions should or should 
not be performed. In these explanations, young people come to understand the reasons of the 
carer and these can eventually become her own reasons. In this manner, nurturers help their 
charges on their own path to virtue, and the reasons and thoughtful engagement they have 
been taught become a part of their own character dispositions. For example, in Austen’s 
                                                                 
31
 Cf. EN VIII.2.1155b31-2; VIII.3.1156a8-10. 
32
 His and himself may be substituted for a male subject. 
33
 ‘[W]e enlist partners in deliberation on large issues’ (EN III.3, 1112b10). 
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Sense and Sensibility, young Marianne makes a series of rash decisions based on immediate 
sentiment. Her elder sister, Elinor, takes a great deal of time and effort to nurture Marianne 
by explaining to her the harmful effects of her carelessness. Over time, Marianne comes to 
make more reasoned and measured choices, which incorporate her sister’s ideals; these then 
become part of her own psychological make-up. At the end of the book when she decides to 
marry someone she respects, this shows that her character has matured and taken on aspects 
of her older sister’s good sense. For Elinor, her activity of nurturing her sister lives on in 
Marianne. And thus, the continuity of Marianne’s virtuous life is a part of her own worthy 
life because the good actions of a friend are in some way ‘one’s own’ (oikeias) (1170a3-4).  
Just as a person chooses to be virtuous, as this in itself is leading the best life, she chooses 
to benefit her friends so that they can live well too. Recognition or admiration is a paltry prize 
beside the actual realisation of the good of another. Even if one has no relationship (or no 
longer has a relationship) with the person one has nurtured, there is the fact of that 
completion and goodness out there in the world, a ‘fine’ human lives on to make their own 
good choices. This is presumably why best friends wish for the other’s good even if nobody 





Nurturing: The individual and Society. The Aristotelian model of parenting explains why, no 
matter how unrewarding it feels, parenting is not a burden or something that imposes 
‘opportunity costs’ that have to be compensated for (Alstott 2004).34 On the contrary, 
nurturing those younger than ourselves is part of what it can be to live a fulfilled human life. 
It might initially seem peculiar to think of our efforts to help young people to thrive as part of 
loving and wishing for our own existence (EN IX.7.1166a22, 1168a6). In Aristotle’s broader 
view of things, it is natural for anything that lives to strive to sustain itself; this is a pattern 
into which humans fit well. It is good to exist and to exist as the active living beings we are.35 
Furthermore, it is quite right that one’s life and existence is of value to oneself (1175a18). It 
is precisely the failure to appreciate this that leads to the difficulties faced by the mother in 
Jean Hampton’s example. As Hampton explains, ‘“selfless” people such as Terry are in 
danger of losing the self they ought to be developing, and as a result, may be indirectly 
harming the very people for whom they care’ (1993, p.143)   
We can also note how helpful Aristotle’s idea of deliberative choice is – rather than 
being at the mercy of biology or social pressure, nurturing the young is a fully human activity 
only when it is thoughtfully chosen. Although one may instantly feel affection for young 
people this is never enough to give them what they require. Any unrealistic expectations of 
instant joy must be replaced by reasoned choices which aim for the long-term well-being of 
the friend. This aim requires patience since people develop slowly. Aristotle thought that 
maturity came only in one’s 30s.36 Thus these relationships are likely to continue for one’s 
whole life. Furthermore, from maturity onwards, all interactions with younger members of 
                                                                 
34
 There may well be reasons why parents need to be compensated within industrialised societies if they are 
unable otherwise to gain adequate resources to carry out this crucial human work. 
35
 GA II.1.731b30-1: ‘being is better than not being and living than not l iving’. 
36
 Aristotle often notes that the young are not virtuous; his descriptions correspond most to people in their 
late teens and 20s (EN 1179b12-16, 1080a33-4; 1095a3-8). For Aristotle, a son becomes independent from a 
father and begins to manage on his own when he sets up a household and begins to have children ( GA 
II.4.740a7). Aristotle recommends that this is best done when a man is in their mid-30s (Pol. VII.14.1335a28). 
Modern science offers some support for this view. See BBC newsbeat 19 March 2019: ‘People Don’t Become 
“Adults” Until Their 30s Say Scientists’. 
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our kind are potentially enriching in the manner detailed. There is good reason, then, to 
encourage the mixing of different age groups in our communities, for the benefit of both 
older and younger people.37 Contemporary projects that combine facilities for the elderly 
with those for young children have proven an enormous success. These report a blossoming 
in the children, with significant improvements in cognitive and speech development, as well 
as a renewed ‘sense of purpose’ in the elderly people involved (Goddard 2017). The real 
reason for this is that human lives need to be integrated into each other and overlap 
significantly. From the start of life until its middle, people are nurtured and form part of the 
lives of their carers; once mature, people begin to nurture those younger than themselves and 
so integrate these new people into their own lives. 
Aristotle acknowledges that political involvement is necessary for human well-being 
(Pol. I.2.1253a29-39). Politics is a productive science, aiming at the production of good 
people and the continuation of their goodness. Renewal of human communities requires some 
kind of structure which is why one has to teach the young not only to nurture others 
personally but also to be politicians (Pol. I.5.1260b20-21; Cf. EN X.9.1181a7-9). But the 
production of good humans can never be achieved solely from the top-down. The only 
safeguard against the degeneration of morals within communities is the continual renewal of 
virtue through virtuous people producing and nurturing the young on a personal level.38  
As affection and friendship binds the city-state together (EN VIII.1.1155a22-27), the 
root of human political activity is in the care for the young one interacts with; the political 
cannot exist without its basis in personal choices to nurture younger friends.39 The friendships 
that we have for those younger than ourselves in our communities are not a luxury or a 
whimsical personal choice but necessary for the continuation of the human way of life (bios) 
into the future. Public benefit is an extension of those personal actions which form part of a 
well lived human life.40 From an external perspective, it may be very difficult to tell whether 
a person has lived a fully good life. But one sure sign is to track the fate of their beneficiaries 
of nurture, who reflect that person’s virtues.41 Only those who are the best people produce the 
best people for the future – and those, who in turn, can produce the next generation’s human 
success.42 
 
Sophia M Connell 
                                                                 
37
 ‘It is fitting that this organization be divided into age-groups, that some of the rulers spend time with younger 
people, and that the older men spend time with the rulers’ (Pol. VII.12.1331a38-41).  
38
 See Kontos 2018. As he so astutely puts it, for Aristotle ‘human beings constitute an inexhaustible source of 
political redemption’ (p. 96).  
39
 Here we might compare the early black feminist writer, Maria W. Stewart, who encouraged mothers to 
produce children that could change society: ‘O, ye mothers …It is you that must create in the minds of your 
l ittle girls and boys a thirst for knowledge, the love of virtue…Do not say you  cannot make any thing of your 
children’ (quoted in Hill  Collins 2000, p. 4). 
40 This can be contrasted with Plato who downplays personal nurture in favour of grand gestures – indeed 
poems: ‘everyone….would look up to Homer, Hesiod, and the other good poets  with envy and admiration for 
the offspring they have left behind – offspring, which, because they are immortal themselves, provide their 
parents with immortal glory and remembrance’ (Symposium 209d-e). 
41
 The fact that famous politicians, considered superficially by Anytus  as depicted by Plato, to be successful, 
could not really be virtuous, is evident in their inability to make their sons so (Meno 93A-94E). Anytus himself 
was held in bad repute (even after his death) because he failed to educate his own son, a useless alcoholic (Klein 
1965, p. 65). Aristotle acknowledges that one can be unlucky and have a bad child through no fault of one’s own 
(EN I.8, 1099b5). However, given his emphasis on our control over the exercise and maintenance of our own 
virtuous choices (‘it is the activities that express virtue that control happiness’ EN I.10, 1100b10, trans. Irwin), 
this would seem to be a very rare occurrence. 
42
 ‘[O]ur planet provides no examples of highly successful societies… who have ignored development in the 
early years’ (WHO report on Early Child Development 2007). 
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